This study investigates the role that logistics played in the failure of the German Offensive in the Ardennes in 1944. The thesis explains that despite the incredible buildup of forces and supplies, the inability of the German strategic and...
The battle of the Ardennes was historic. The lessons of experience and accomplishments (as well as an opportunity for future forces to learn) are documented by the 84th Infantry Division- this is a preservation of that history. Sections detailing...
This monograph discusses the planning and execution of the 1944 Ardennes campaign, analyzes the reasons for Allied success and German failure, and based on that analysis examines the validity of certain theoretical concepts relating to the practice...
This paper examines the applicability of the theories of the 19th Century military theorist, Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, to modern 20th century mid- to high intensity conflict. To do this it briefly reviews the core of Jomini's most famous work,...
This monograph examines the ability of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to provide predictive intelligence. IPB is the foundation of tactical intelligence and plays a major role in tactical planning prior to the battle. There is a...
This monograph seeks to determine whether the counterattack demands prioritization in the operational defense. It examines the operational defender's force allocation when he confronts a major enemy offensive thrust. The study includes a review of...
Beverly, Charlie L.; Steele, Bryan L.; Martin, Keith; Daigle, Roger; Santos, Rick
Thesis: The Battle of the Bulge lasted from December 16, 1944 to January 28, 1945 and was the largest land battle in terms of the number of soldiers and the area of land in which the United States participated during World War II.
This study examines the role of U.S. Army Engineers fighting as infantry in AirLand Battle by analyzing the actions of the 1111th Engineer Combat Group during the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944. The 51st and 291st Engineer Combat Battalions...
This study examines the nature of the defense at the operational level of war by analyzing the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944 using the concepts of blitzkrieg and "web" defense. The monograph begins by discussing the influence of defensive...
AirLand Battle doctrine introduced the operational level of war- the design and conduct of campaigns and major operations- to the U.S. Army. Operational art begins with operational planning. FM 100-5 identifies branches, sequels, and the employment...
Lieutenant General Troy H. Middleton effectively commanded division and corps formations in World War II. His previous combat experience included command of the 47th Infantry Regiment in World War I. During the interwar period, Middleton served as...
This thesis investigates the significance, theory and practice of tactical signal security (SIGSEC) during the Ardennes Offensive of 1944-1945. The work includes a brief introduction to the offensive and to the history of SIGSEC, and examines how...
General Schwarzkopf was unhappy with the tempo of the VII Corps attack during Operation Desert Storm. Likewise, a recent Rand study of over 115 NTC battles highlighted the technique of overwatch as a significant detractor to sustaining tempo in the...
FM 100-5 identifies four, fundamental tenets necessary for successful implementation of AirLand Battle doctrine. These tenets are initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relative importance...
One of German General Carl Von Clausewitz's key concepts is culmination. His primary work On War describes culmination for the attacker as the point beyond which he can no longer continue his attack and risks destruction from a counterattack. For...
'Operational IPB' describes U.S. Army doctrine for the precombat intelligence estimate process employed at the operational level of war. Its methodology is contained in an appendix to a tactical field manual, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of...
Contents include: World War II and Battle of the Bulge chronologies; WWII allied conferences; Allied Command architecture and order of battle; the U.S. Army in December 1944; biographical sketches- senior allied commanders; German command...
This monograph discusses whether U. S. Army operational commanders are still susceptible to surprise. The principle of surprise remains an important consideration for campaign planners. Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm relied heavily on...
The purpose of this monograph is to examine the doctrine of retrograde operations. Specifically, it answers the question: does current doctrine provide sufficient guidance for retrograde operations at the operational level of war? To answer the...
This monograph discusses the concept of operational momentum as it relates to achieving and exploiting depth during offensive operations. Its purpose is to identify those elements which are essential to achieving and maintaining speed and mass...