This monograph examines the question can modern metaphors, based on late twentieth century nonlinear scientific thought, better explain concepts described by Clausewitz, using early nineteenth century linear scientific thought. Clausewitz...
It is dangerous to assume that in today's operating environment, a universally accepted definition of what war is, and what war is not, is readily available. While most Soldiers and policy makers claim to know war, "knowing it when they see it," is...
One of German General Carl Von Clausewitz's key concepts is culmination. His primary work On War describes culmination for the attacker as the point beyond which he can no longer continue his attack and risks destruction from a counterattack. For...
This paper will describe the significant events and experiences that shaped the Powell Doctrine and affected the manner in which General Colin Powell applied those principles during his tenure as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)...
This study examines the validity of Clausewitz's conclusions about the defense on the future battlefield. It discusses the correctness of the adoption of Clausewitz's ideas in the operational manuals of the American and German Army (Field Manual...
This monograph examines the theoretical linkages between Clausewitz's trinity and the spectrum of conflict, the effect of change on the interpretation of each, and the resultant impact on the concept of operational art. It identifies the common...
Over the years, there has been debate within the services about whether Clausewitz's theories should be used as a basis for modern warfighting doctrine. The majority of debate has focused on the specific issue of whether Clausewitz's most well...
On a theoretical level, defensive campaigns are the stronger form of war. As Clausewitz said, “All things being equal defense is the stronger form.” However on the practical side defensive campaigns can only remain the stronger form of war if...
The 1986 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, introduced a theoretical basis to AirLand Battle, the U.S. Army's basic fighting doctrine. One of the new concepts introduced into the doctrine was 'center of gravity.' The manual indicated...
The attached monograph seeks to analyze in general terms the economic dimension in war planning. It focuses on the causes and implications of the often inescapable incompatibility between political/economic objectives and military aims. Much of...
In 1986, the US Army published a revision of FM 100-5, Operations, that, for the first time, clearly linked military theory and its doctrine. In this manual, a term defined by Carl von Clausewitz as the hub of all power and movement, the center of...
Improvements in technology worldwide have amplified the impact strategic lieutenants and strategic corporals have on strategic matters. These Strategic Soldiers and their respective leaders must not only be aware of their potential influence in a...
This monograph examines the concept "center of gravity" as applied by coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm. Center of gravity is an integral part of operational art and figures prominently in current U.S. doctrine. It begins by tracing...
A key theoretical proposition offered by Clausewitz in On War was that the defense was the stronger form of war over the offense. Members of the military, theorists, and historians have intermittently grappled with this proposition and have tended...
This monograph studies the meaning behind the infamous Clausewitzian concept of the trinity. He uses this concept to describe the essence of warfare in book one of his treatise “On War”. This concept permeates his discussion of warfare...
Given ongoing conflicts and the likelihood of executing counterinsurgency in the future, it is vital to conduct effective campaign planning for counterinsurgency. Additionally, effective campaign planning is essential for rapid and effective...
If strategists do not follow Clausewitz’s lead as a critical historian, then they risk failure by founding future policy, strategy, and operations on Kosovo myths. One must ask, was Operation Allied Force a rational use of military power to...
This monograph examines time estimation at the operational level of war. The study begins with a review of Classical Military Theory to identify the theoretical basis for time estimation. It next examines the Theory of Operational Art to discern...
This study analyses the influence of the German idealist philosopher G.W.F. Hegel (1779-1831) on the method and thought of the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). The study contends that a complete understanding of the...
This monograph examines Carl von Clausewitz's theoretical concept of the defensive culminating point and the ability of Army doctrine and its analysis system--Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield--to determine an enemy's courses of action...