Chaos theory is a poorly understood concept in social science and in military analytical decision making systems. Military decision makers require a multidisciplinary approach of mathematical analysis, modeling and simulation, topology, and...
This is a study about defeat, specifically addressing the question of whether and under what circumstances non-state actors will accept defeat. This study challenges conventional wisdom that victory and defeat have a reciprocal relationship....
This monograph directly addresses design, and incorporates elements of Engineering Design Theory to the codified, social act of campaign creation using art, science, and craft. The monograph gives a definition of design and discusses the...
The U.S. Army's first Future Combat System (FCS) equipped Brigade Combat Team (BCT) becomes fully operational in 2015. Concern for the possibility of combined arms capability gaps between planned FCS capacities and those required to defeat the...
From the Classical Period until the Seventeenth century, the study of warfare was practiced predominantly using the vehicle of history. The scientific revolution, ushered in by Newtonian laws, had a major impact on Western military thinking. By...
Col. John Boyd, USAF (Ret),famous for developing the OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) loop model, spent most of his adult life trying to convince the U.S. military establishment of the merits of his theory for maneuver warfare later called the Boyd...
Modern communications, data processing systems, and the complexity of modern land warfare have led to the explosion of information in tactical combat organizations. The commander must use this information within a decision process to exploit its...
Sorrells, William T., Downing, Glen R., Blakesley, Paul J., Pendall, David W., Walk, Jason K., Wallwork, Richard D.
Systemic Operational Design (SOD) is an application of systems theory to operational art. It is an attempt to rationalize complexity through systemic logic employing a holistic approach that translates strategic direction and policy into...
Synchronization, "the ability to focus resources and activities in time and space to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point," is a tenet of US Army doctrine. This monograph reviews the concept of synchronization at the...
The latest U. S. Army doctrine calls for quick, decisive victory with minimum casualties. Historically, simultaneity has provided a means of doing this. However, current trends are making it increasingly likely that non-linear operations will be...
This monograph offers a definition of "military art," discusses military art's relationship to the commander's management of battlefield uncertainty, and uncertainty's relationship to nonlinearity. Using the terms of art, uncertainty, and...
The age of reductionism is over, new laws of physics are being discovered, and the old theoretical constructs are being replaced with new understanding. The modern operating environment in common with the world of physics has changed. This change,...
The United States Army, along with its sister services, is struggling to create effective doctrinal concepts for warfighting in the Information Age. Man’s ability to manipulate and transport information at light speed is changing the conduct of...
There is a common view within the United States Army that Information Operations is a military doctrine designed to win a "battle of ideas" within human populations. This monograph refutes this understanding of Information Operations by tracing the...
The U.S. Army underwent significant doctrinal changes in the years following the Vietnam War. The 1976 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, championed by General William DePuy, attempted to guide the Army's actions necessary to defeat the Soviet...
This paper analyzes leading edge information age management concepts future armies are likely to adopt. There are two premises which shape the research. Change is occurring, today with greater speed, volume, and complexity. War is a reflection of...
Complexity theory has attracted considerable interest from operational artists in recent times. However, because it is still an emerging field, there are few -- if any -- historical case studies that show how complexity applies to military...
The military needs an autonomous ground convoy capability because the speed and complexity of the environment in which it operates has begun to exceed the abilities of its members to operate within it. U.S. Army doctrine requires the logistics...
The Department of Defense must establish specially trained and selected advisory teams that immerse themselves in the country for 2-3 years, and who work at the regional, country and unit level, provide the cultural understanding and regional...