This thesis examines the current inadequacy of small arms training for all military occupational specialties (MOSs) in the conventional Army and the lack of focus on weapons training for the dynamic nonlinear/noncontiguous (NL/NC), asymmetrical...
This monograph examines whether infantry small units, trained and equipped solely for war, can successfully conduct operations other than war (OOTW). Many military professionals argue that units trained for war can readily adapt to OOTW. Yet, other...
Throughout its history the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has exhibited brilliant tactical performance. The War of Independence, the Sinai Campaign, the Six Day War, and even the 1973 War placed Israel on a martial pedestal with few peers. On closer...
The U.S. armed forces face a global information threat which could launch an attack without warning. This surprise attack could damage the U.S. armed forces ability to mobilize, deploy and control forces worldwide. The attack will use the global...
Although operational level intelligence was assessed as adequate for the initial phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, discussion about the inadequacy of tactical intelligence support for commanders continues to resonate within the Military...
Bailey, Jose; Callaghan, Jerry; Fowler, Gary; Krouser, Emma; Whitcomb, Keith
Thesis Statement. General Navarre's Bad Plan Led to France's Defeat at Dien Bien Phu.
2.
Discussion. On 20 November 1953, Navarre, against the advice ofhis commanders, launched Operation Castor. The largest airborne operation French forces in...
The citizens of the United States face disaster every year. Whether man made, natural, large or small the individual states provide a first line of defense and response with their resources and by agreement, through the Emergency Management...
This monograph examines the organization and missions of the Army-of-Excellence divisional cavalry squadron as outlined in the 1980 Operational and Organizational Concept for Division and Corps 86 Cavalry and in Field Circular 71-8, AOE Close...
This monograph analyzes the combined effects of changes in engineer training curriculum, adjustments to priorities in vehicle replacement programs, shortages of equipment, and disproportional combat engineer versus integral combat service support...
When war erupted in the American colonies in 1775 at Lexington and Concord, the British Empire was logistically unprepared. Neither the army nor the supporting administration in Great Britain could comprehend the nature of their opponent or the...
In an age predominated by states but rife with non-state actors, failing states, increasingly fluid boundaries, disenfranchised yet interconnected populations, and increasingly self-aware cultures, the United States must develop a foreign policy...
The metamorphosis of the United States Army’s tactical Military Intelligence (MI) organization and doctrine since 1976 has been remarkable. Transitioning from a conglomerate of capabilities borrowed from disparate organizations, MI units became...
In spite of experience that shows post-conflict stability operations are inevitable, the U.S. military places more emphasis on winning the fighting and less on the decisive post-combat phase. This has resulted in increased risk to the mission and...
This study examines current obstacle planning procedures to determine their adequacy for supporting the conduct of war at the operational level of war. The major premise of the paper is that obstacles can have a significant impact on military...
It is dangerous to assume that in today's operating environment, a universally accepted definition of what war is, and what war is not, is readily available. While most Soldiers and policy makers claim to know war, "knowing it when they see it," is...
General Matthew B. Ridgway’s astonishing ability to visualize a military campaign matured based on his leader development, the lessons that he learned from failure and from personally mastering operational art. During World War II, Ridgway...
This paper discusses the following reasons for the Russian defeat by the Japanese to be caused by a lack of military preparedness, Japan's control of the sea, inadequacy of railway communication, poor operations by the Russian forces, and lack of...
The China-Burma-India Theater was the least decisive major arena of World War II. General Joseph Stilwell was tasked to perform concurrent diplomatic and military miracles in pursuit of Allied victory. His mission of keeping a reluctant China in...
The Army Air Force entered World War II poorly equipped and underprepared to support ground commanders with photo and visual reconnaissance. While doctrine fared better, it lacked the depth needed to employ reconnaissance effectively from the...