A. Reasons for Arab armies’ perpetual ineffectiveness are rooted in Arab culture. Social factors that prohibit success include: secrecy and paranoia, pride, class structure, a lack of coordination on all levels, and little individual freedom or...
Forward by Dr. William G. Robertson: The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present its latest publication in the Occasional Paper Series, "We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There" The Soviet Approach in Afghanistan,1979-1989, by Mr....
Forward by Dr. William G. Robertson: The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present its latest publication in the Occasional Paper Series, "We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There" The Soviet Approach in Afghanistan,1979-1989, by Mr....
What is the probability for renewed conflict in the Sinai region in light of Egypt's recent revolution? This monograph examines that question by analyzing Nasser's Free Officer revolution of the 1950s that led to 1956 Suez Crisis (Nasser era) and...
As officer in charge of the 101st Airborne Division Main in Iraq from March to May 2003, Major Susan Arnold - a JAG officer - was involved with targeting and rules of engagement issues during the major combat phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. After...
In support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Colonel Peter "Duke" DeLuca commanded the 101st Airborne Division's 326th Engineer Battalion during the major combat phase and then, from June 2004 through June 2005, served as the J7 engineer for Lieutenant...
This monograph presents a new concept of division deep battle characterized by decentralized planning and execution by task organized, combined arms brigades instead of the current Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) method. The study first...