The Arab Rebellion and British Counter-rebellion campaign of 1936 to 1939 in Palestine exhibited many features of modern insurgency and counter-insurgency. This thesis traces the British military thought and practice for countering rebellion as...
Since the events of September 11, 2001 the United States military counternetwork operations, theory, and doctrine have failed to account for the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks used by both interstate insurgencies, such...
The Army has equipped leaders with the tools to address most elements of a counterinsurgency. However, it has failed to do so with economics. This is because of three reasons. First, they cannot settle on a theory. Second is a lack of clearly...
Operational design is an intellectual exercise that draws on the creative vision, experience, intuition, and judgment of commanders to provide a framework for development of detailed operation plans. Recently, a number of authors have questioned...
At the core of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is the concept of “hearts and minds.” Although the concept has significantly deviated from its historical grounding and has become a nebulous concept that is frequently maligned, misunderstood, and...
The consequences for failing to prepare for the next war can be significant. How does the United States military balance the perceived requirement for its traditional competencies in major combat operations with the near-term requirement for...
Researching whether properly structured organizations, at combatant commands, develop more effective communication strategy is the purpose of this monograph. Proper structure is defined in current doctrine and key communication literature. Proper...
How can the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) be improved in order to better understand the operational environment? The application of the ICAF requires good intellectual habits that encompass an appreciation for abductive reasoning...
The military is increasingly using and relying on the term "narrative" in its lexicon. United States strategic guidance documents generally implore commanders to "shape the narrative," doctrinal publications recommend commanders to "exploit a...
With the introduction of new capstone doctrine, the U.S. Army should invest more time in the formal education of future leaders. This study demonstrates the importance of operational art, the theory used to develop campaigns and major operations in...
Interagency transformation has the potential to radically increase the strategic and operational capacities of the U.S. Government's interagency system. This transformation will require changes to the structure and processes employed by the...
Starting in 1991, a consortium of criminologists, social psychologists, and law school professors began researching how jurors in capital cases come to their decisions. This body of work, called the Capital Jury Project (CJP), found several trends...
The most respected theorists of counterinsurgency agree about prescriptive principles for the organization of counterinsurgency campaigns. Insurgencies and counterinsurgency campaigns are each unique (sui generis), yet the theorists help provide...
Does following the rule of law assist security forces in defeating an armed insurgency? If so, what factors assist or prevent security forces from conducting operations in accordance with rule of law principles? Counterinsurgency literature and...
As design emerges throughout the United States Army’s planning and operational doctrine, the intelligence community must leverage this structure of inquiry to identify and refocus the scope of what is collected, analyzed, produced and...
The prevailing U.S. Army professional military education (PME) system reflects the legacy of the twentieth-century, modern, mechanized age of warfare. The twenty-first century security environment presents a unique set of challenges for U.S....
This essay discusses the need for U.S. government agencies to develop a ground-level understanding and execution in its expeditionary interagency professionals in order to synchronize broader institutional reforms. The author posits that the teams...
Warfare in the modem era will be joint. However, the Armed Forces have been slow to make requisite changes. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 forced change by legislating reforms and ending the internecine...
It is the enemy’s will to resist that is the true objective of war. Destruction of his armed forces is a means and not necessarily mandatory to achieve this objective. To save the precious resources of blood and treasure and to assure the...
This monograph analyzes the shift in tactical doctrine in the US Army between 1968 and 1986. These dates bracket a period of major change when the Army struggled to match its tactical doctrine with the realities of late twentieth century armored...